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reSumen: en los últimos años, la investigación sobre Schopenhauer ha sufrido un cambio
en la interpretación de su obra principal, El mundo como voluntad y representación, a partir de (1)
una instrucción normativa y lineal, que guía al lector del idealismo al misticismo, al pesimismo
y a la nada y a (2) descripciones libres e independientes del mundo con todos los fenómenos
(como el idealismo, el misticismo, la nada, etc.). así, el trabajo principal de Schopenhauer se
ha convertido en un enfoque empírico o baconiano —algo así como una «cosmografía filo-
sófica»—. este cambio fundamental de interpretación pone radicalmente en tela de juicio lo
que Schopenhauer entiende al caracterizar su obra principal como «sistema orgánico». el pre-
sente artículo intenta dar una respuesta a esta pregunta, revisando los indicios auto-reflexivos,
metodológicos y metafilosóficos que Schopenhauer da en el primer volumen de su «mundo»
(«voluntad y representación»).
palabraS clave: sistema, El mundo como voluntad y representación, Schopenhauer, filosofía,
mundo. 
abStract: in recent years, the research on Schopenhauer has shown a change in the inter-
pretation of  his main work, The World as Will and Presentation, from (1) a normative and linear
instruction which guides the reader from idealism to mysticism, pessimism and nothingness
to (2) value-free and independent descriptions of  the world with all phenomena (like idealism,
mysticism, nothingness etc.) in it. thus Schopenhauer’s main work has become an empirical
or baconian approach—something like a «philosophical cosmography»—. this fundamental
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change of  interpretation radically puts into question what Schopenhauer means by charac-
terizing his main work as an «organic system». the present paper attempts to give an answer
to this question, reviewing the self-reflexive, methodological and metaphilosophical hints
which Schopenhauer gives in the first volume of  his «World» («as Will and presentation»).
keyWordS: system, The World as Will and Presentation, Schopenhauer, philosophy, world.
1. INTRODUCTION
iin each of  these four books», arthur Schopenhauer writes in the preface to the first edi-tion of  his main work The World as Will and Presentation I (= WWP I), «on account of  thenecessary treatment of  relevant details, one needs to be particularly careful not to lose
sight of  the main thought or progression of  the entire exposition» (WWp i, p. 11)1. With the
death of  Schopenhauer’s last «apostles» and «evangelists» —he referred to his adherents in
that way— the apprehension that the reader of  his system could lose sight in it has proved
to be well founded. For far too long, the philosophical research on Schopenhauer’s philosophy
has been engaged in the details of  the system: the interest was primarily focused on idealism,
epistemology, kantian influence, metaphysics, pessimism and religious topics. because of
concentration on these special topics, a world-wide prejudice on Schopenhauer’s philosophy
has been formed: to this day, every student knows that Schopenhauer is regarded as one of
the most influential proponents of  pessimism and world-negation; but there is no thorough
study which can help in finding an answer to the question of  what the «organic system» of
WWP I is, about which Schopenhauer speaks (p. 10).
in recent years, however, the interpretation of  Schopenhauer in research has begun to
change. a detailed overview of  the current status of  research was delivered by de cian, Segala
1 the following abbreviations are used for Schopenhauer’s writings:
bm On the Basis of  Morality
eFr On the Fourfold Root of  the Principle of  Sufficient Reason [i. e. Schopenhauer’s 
Early Fourfold Root, 1813 edition]
Gbr Gesammelte Briefe, 2nd ed. by a. hübscher (münchen: bouvier, 1987)
Fr On the Fourfold Root of  the Principle of  Sufficient Reason
FW On the Freedom of  the Will
mr Manuscript Remains
pp i; ii Parerga et Paralipomena
vc On Vision and Colours
vn i-iv Philosophische Vorlesungen: Aus dem handschriftlichen Nachlaß, vols i-4, ed. by
volker Spierling. 2nd ed. (piper: münchen, 1987-1990)
WWp i; ii The World as Will and Presentation, vols. 1 and 2, transl. by richard e. aquila in 
collaboration with david carus. new york et al.: prentice hall, 2008/2011).
Wn On the Will in Nature
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and lemanski and will not be discussed here2. Just one short remark: there are many historical
arguments as well as textual references for the view that Schopenhauer’s philosophy does not
support pessimism, denial of  life etc. but what are the main thought and the progression of
his entire exposition? one of  the most important historical arguments for this new kind of
interpretation can be called the absolute-book-argument and it has been advanced by hans
blumenberg3. the argument says that, in the age of  enlightenment, there are many works
like Schelling’s On University Studies, Fichte’s Characteristics of  the Present Age, alexander von
humboldt» Cosmos as well as Schopenhauer’s WWP I which were intended to replace the bible
by writing those «absolute books» in which all facts and phenomena of  the world are de-
scribed. according to theodore Sider, their ambitions were «to write the book of  the world»4.
textual support for this absolute-book-argument can be found in Schopenhauer’s emphatic
words: «the world, the world, you donkeys! is the problem of  philosophy, the world and
nothing else!» (hn iv/1 p. 302, also WWp ii, p. 213) 
however, this already underlines that Schopenhauer’s empirical or realistic approach can
be inspiring for today’s philosophy of  the world:5 For although Schopenhauer takes a repre-
sentational theory for granted, his project can be attributed neither to epistemology nor to
philosophy of  language. in this article, one of  my main theses is that Schopenhauer can be
seen as a pragmatist who established a conceptual schema in order to help people to orient
themselves in the world. WWP I is not an epistemological, not a metaphysical, not an aesthetic
nor an ethical writing (these topics are the content of  the four books), but it is a philosophical
cosmography of  which epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics and ethics are a part, because
they are a part of  the mental, social and physical world. 
thus my philosophical-cosmography-argument is a systematic extension of  blumenberg’s
historical absolute-book-argument. in order to support my thesis systematically, i will focus
in this article on the main thought and progression of  the entire WWP I. What are the topics
in this book? how were these topics arranged? What is the structure of  the whole system
and which is its objective? after a short overview about the current state of  research (sect.
2), i will examine the prefaces (sect. 3), book i-iv (sect. 4-7) of  WWP I and consider the re-
sults (sect. 8).
2 Cfr. nicoletta de cian and marco Segala, «What is Will?», 83, Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch (2002), pp. 13-43. le-
manski, J., «the denial of  the Will-to-live in Schopenhauer’s World and his association of  buddhist and chris-
tian Saints», Understanding Schopenhauer through the Prism of  Indian Culture: Philosophy, Religion and Sanskrit Literature,
de Gruyter: berlin et al., 2013, pp. 149-187.
3 Cfr. blumenberg, h., Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, Suhrkamp: Frankfurt/main, 1986.
4 theodore r. Sider, Writing the Book of  the World, oxford univ. press: oxford, 2011.
5 Cfr. ibid. david J.chalmers, Constructing the World, oxford univ. press: oxford 2012. heil, J., The Universe as
We Find It, oxford univ. press: oxford, 2012). Gabriel, m., Warum es die Welt nicht gibt, ullstein: berlin, 2013.
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2. THE CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH IN THE SYSTEMATIC STRUCTURE OF WWP I
even a cursory glance into the bibliographies about Schopenhauer’s works reveals an extensive
list of  publications concerning his systematical approach. however, on closer analysis, almost
all titles cannot deliver what they promise. here, some examples recorded in chronological
order: in 1857, rudolf  Seydel published a monograph with the title Schopenhauers philosophisches
System in which he almost exclusively discusses inconsistencies and contradictions in Schopen-
hauer’s philosophy6 and he only treats the question of  whether they endanger the systematic
character of  WWP I. William caldwell in 1896 published a study under the title Schopenhauer’s
System in its Philosophical Significance, presenting a very unique interpretation of  the main topics
of  WWP I in relation to other philosophers, especially hegel and von hartmann7. but there
is no hint concerning the systematic character. not only the title of  otto Jenson’s Die Ursache
der Widersprüche im Schopenhauerschen System but also the content claims that the author of  this
dissertation is not really interested in the systematic approach8. he states that the person
Schopenhauer was more an artist than a scientist, and therefore all contradictions in his main
work which are mentioned in the scientific research are unimportant to the author.
up to the year 1960, it seems to me that the phrase «Schopenhauer’s system» played no
significant role in book titles, paper sections or even sentences in the scientific community;
rather, it seems as if  we could substitute «(Schopenhauer’s) philosophy» for «system». at first,
Gerhard klamp seemed little mindful of  the function of  the term «system» in Schopenhauer’s
main work. klamp wrote an article about the architecture in Schopenhauer’s oeuvre and tried
to extract the systematic character by focusing on the relationship 1) between the four books
within the WWP I, 2) between WWP I and WWP II, 3) between WWP I & II and the four
monographs (FR,VC, WN and BM together with FW), and 4) between the aforementioned
works and PP I & II9. klamp’s pioneering work is very valuable to us because he was the first
one who deals with the systematic topic and makes the obvious fact, that WWP I is the sys-
tematic centre of  Schopenhauer’s whole oeuvre, explicit. however, as with almost every pi-
oneering work, there are many problems in detail: klamp does not advance his arguments
on any textual basis and does not reflect on his premises. let me discuss a small number of
key elements concerning our topic: klamp focuses on the relationship 1) between the four
books within the WWP I and he uses the implicit premise that book iv contains the «im-
6 Cfr. Seydel, r., Schopenhauers philosophisches System, breitkopf  und härtel: leipzig, 1857, p. vi ff.
7 Cfr. caldwell, W., Schopenhauer’s System in its Philosophical Significance, blackwood and Sons: edinburgh, london,
1896.
8 Jenson, o., Die Ursache der Widersprüche im Schopenhauerschen System, rats- und universitäts-buchhandlung
von adlers erben: rostock 1906.
9 klamp, G., «die architektonik im Gesamtwerk Schopenhauers», 41, Jahrbuch der Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft
(1960), pp. 82-98.
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pressive closing passage» («eindrucksvolle Schlusspartien»)10 of  the system, so that book iii
is an introduction («vorschule»)11 to it. Following the contemporary research on Schopen-
hauer’s term «organic system»12, there is no evidence for this premise. thus, since klamp’s
study, concerning the relationship 1) between the four books within WWP I, is based on a
false premise, then the results of  the study are unfounded. today, researchers on Schopen-
hauer’s system are convinced that all books in WWP I are equal even if  they are not inde-
pendent13. For example: it is possible that one can find important premises in book iii for
an argument in book iv, but this does not make book iii an introduction to book iv.
these key elements show that klamp has been doing research on the systematic character
of  Schopenhauer’s work within a paradigm which is different from ours. in klamp’s paradigm
Schopenhauer is considered one of  the most pessimistic and mystical authors and WWP I is
regarded as a normative and linear instruction, guiding the reader from idealism (book i) to
mysticism and nothingness (book iv). in the last two decades, as mentioned above, this pic-
ture has become a prejudice, but now WWP I is regarded as value-free and independent
descriptions of  the world with all phenomena (like idealism, mysticism, nothingness) in it.
today, however, our problem is twofold: First, no one has continued klamp’s research, so
that still today researchers as well as students have to use his article. Furthermore, a cursory
glance into current books about Schopenhauer shows that «(Schopenhauer’s) system» is some-
times used once again as a synonym for «philosophy» etc. Second, klamp has outlined that
he has just examined the external construction [äußerer Aufbau], but not the inner one [innerer
Aufbau]14. For that reason, i will focus on the inner construction of  WWP I by following
the premises of  the contemporary research on Schopenhauer. to enable the reader to un-
derstand the contemporary reading of  Schopenhauer’s system which is founded in WWP I,
i will give an overview of  the content of  each of  the four books and the prefaces i, ii and
iii; in order to do that, i will collect and analyse the passages in which the author reflects
upon his system.
3. PREFACES OF THE WWP I
even in «continental philosophy» it can be taken for granted that books have a special topic
and are written for a specific reason. but after 200 years it is not always easy to find answers
10 Ibid., p. 85.
11 Ibid., p. 83.
12 Cfr. Strub, c., «Gebäude, organisch verkettet. Zur tropologie des Systems», Metaphorologie. Zur Praxis von
Theorie, ed. by anselm haverkamp, dirk mende, Suhrkamp: Frankfurt/main, 2009, pp. 108-137. For a differing
view cfr. Schubbe, d., Philosophie des Zwischen: Hermeneutik und Aporetik bei Schopenhauer, königshausen & neu-
mann: Würzburg, 2010, pp. 11-31.
13 Cfr. ibid., pp. 16-31.
14 klamp, «die architektonik im Gesamtwerk Schopenhauers», op. cit., p. 82.
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to the question of  what the specific reason was for writing the Critique of  Pure Reason, the
Science of  Knowing, the Ages of  the World or the Phenomenology of  Spirit. however, in the case of
Schopenhauer the research has found an explicit answer to this implicit question, since
Schopenhauer writes in the preface to the First edition: «What is to be communicated through
it [sc. WWP I] is a single thought. nonetheless, despite all efforts, i could find no shorter way
to communicate it than this entire book» (WWp i, p. 9). and this entire book is structured in
the form of  an «organic system» in which «every part sustains the whole just as much as it is
sustained by the whole, none is the first and none the last, the whole thought gains in dis-
tinctness by the way of  each part, and even the smallest part cannot be fully understood unless
the whole is already understood in advance» (pp. 9-10). but is the communication of  the
single thought a convincing answer to the question of  why Schopenhauer has written WWP
I? Would we, for example, believe a biographer who claimed that Schopenhauer had a single
thought and began thereupon to write such a book? no one becomes a philosopher and
writes a book like the WWP I because he had simply sat down and was suddenly surprised by
one single thought. if  Schopenhauer’s speech about the «single thought» is not an insignificant
metaphor, we have to ask what he was thinking about. altogether, i suggest that either the
question does not fit the answer or that one is or both are incomplete.
most researchers who are dissatisfied with the answer pursue the strategy of  finding the
content of  the single thought. until a couple of  years ago, researchers tried to find this content
in the form of  a proposition within the WWP I15. For the newer research, volker Spierling’s
answer seems to be satisfying enough. he argued that the organic system is the exposition of
the single thought and since the entire book represents this system, the single thought can be
nothing else than the sum of  all propositions in the WWP I16.
as for me, i can say that i am satisfied with this answer, but i am not satisfied with the
whole strategy; for if  Spierling is right, then the answer to the question «why has Schopen-
hauer written the WWP I» can only be that the author has thought the entire book (in one
single thought) —and this answer is not only a truism but also a quasi-tautology—. but let
us keep this Spierling-argument in mind and focus on the connection between the question
and the answer.
in the entire preface i there is no evidence for a question regarding the content of  WWP
I. but in the first sentence of  this preface we can find the question to which the statement of
purpose is the answer: «how this book should be read in order that it may possibly be un-
derstood: it is my intention to state that here» (p. 9). after establishing this objective, Schopen-
hauer speaks about the «one single thought», «the organic system» and comes to the following
15 Cfr. i.e. malter, r., Der eine Gedanke: Hinführung zur Philosophie Arthur Schopenhauers, second edition, Wiss.
buchgesell.: darmstadt, 2010, p. 32.
16 Cfr. Spierling, v., Arthur Schopenhauer zur Einführung, Junius: hamburg, 2002, pp. 14-23. Cfr. furthermore
hübscher, a., Denker gegen den Strom. Schopenhauer: Gestern – Heute – Morgen, bouvier: bonn, 1973, p. 82.
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conclusion of  the question how this book should be read: «it is self-evident that, under such
circumstances, the only advice for penetrating the thought set forth is to read the book twice
[…]» (p. 10). in this quote «such circumstances [solche umstände]» relates to the single
thought and to the organic system. therefore neither circumstance answers the main question
(how this book should be read). rather they provide advice for becoming able to give an an-
swer (to read the book twice).
the research on the single thought as well as the introductions to the WWP I are an indication
that this pattern of  question, argument and answer in the preface i was previously unknown.
as a result, most readers had the unrealistic expectation of  finding a single thought in the
book. but the entire preface i treats the question how WWP I should be read: after the advice
to read the book twice, Schopenhauer explains (1) that the book offers «four points of  view
on the one thought» which is an argument against the normative and for the descriptive read-
ing, (2) that the author treats the reader as a philosopher, (3) that (E)FR is the «introduction»
(einleitung) to WWP I (p. 11), (4) that the reader has to read the first chapter of  vc, and (5)
that she should have made «acquaintance» with kant and plato (p. 12). the rest of  the preface
i (pp. 13-15) deals with the general issue of  dealing with books and can thus be seen as a
continuation of  the main question.
preface ii does not pursue a unified subject. most topics like the truth (pp. 17-19), the
criticism of  the philosophy professors (pp. 25-30) are unimportant to our topic. Solely the
middle section (pp. 20-25) continues the main question of  preface i since there is some advice
about how to read the second edition and especially the supplementary volume ii (WWP II).
the very short preface iii updates readers on how PP I & II are now being used as amend-
ments to WWP I. therefore all three prefaces are mainly answers to the same question which
can be found in the first sentence of  preface i. a further consequence is that none of  the
three prefaces gives an answer to the topic of  the book. and since book i also opens in
medias res with epistemological and especially idealistic topics, all of  this opens the floodgates
to misinterpretations17.
4. BOOK I: COGNITIVE FACULTIES (PRESENTATION)
book i is divided into sixteen sections. it is very helpful that the edition of  WWP I by richard
e. aquila provides in brackets a general indication of  the section’s content. to my knowledge,
there is no other english or German edition of  WWP I which offers such a service. notwith-
standing the convenience to the reader, these indications present a little problem: aquila has
17 Cfr. Schubbe, d., «Formen der (er-)kenntnis. ein morphologischer blick auf  Schopenhauer», Der Besen,
mit dem die Hexe fliegt: Wissenschaft und Therapeutik des Unbewussten, vol. 1, ed. by Günter Gödde, michael buchholz,
psychosozial-verlag: Gießen, 2012, pp. 359-386.
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often tried to indicate every topic of  the section. although the reader knows what to expect,
the little more detailed indication conceals the systematic character. i suspect that the sys-
tematic character becomes increasingly clear by focusing on the main topic. in this case, the
content of  the sections is the following:
§§ Main Topic
1-2 introduction
3 time & Space
4 matter = causality
5 reality of  the external World
6 levels of  cognizance (plants, animals, intuitions)
7 materialism & idealism
8 reflection & reason
9 language (logic & dialectic)
10-13 excursus: relationship between cognizance & reason
14-15 philosophy of  Science
16 practical reason
before i start to explain this table, it would be better to speak about another topic. con-
cerning the contents, book i is divided in two parts: part one extends from § 3 to 7 and relates
to cognizance (Verstand) which is synonymous with «intuitive presentation»; part two extends
from § 8 to 16 and relates to reason (Vernunft), which is synonymous with «abstract presenta-
tion». at the beginning of  § 3, Schopenhauer writes: «We will later consider these abstract pre-
sentations in their own right, but begin by speaking exclusively of  intuitive presentation» (WWp
i, p. 35). the «later consideration» takes place at the very end of  § 7: «but first we need to con-
sider the class of  presentations that pertains to human beings alone, the material for which is
concepts and the subjective correlate of  which is reason, just as the presentation so far considered
was understanding and sensibility, which are also attributable to all animals» (p. 67). 
although the older Schopenhauer (of  the 2nd ed.) incorporates §§ 1-7 of  WWP I into the
first half  of  book i in WWP II (WWp ii, p. 2) , which deals with cognizance (verstand), i
suggest that the younger one (of  the 1st ed.) ought to have incorporated only §§ 3-7 into cog-
nizance: my first argument for this suggestion can be found in the quote of  § 3 (given above).
there, for the first time, a distinction between cognizance and reason is given. my second ar-
gument concerns at first the beginning of  § 1: «“the world is a presentation to me” —this is
a truth that applies to every living and cognizant being—. however, the human being alone
can bring it to reflective abstract consciousness» (WWp i, p. 31); in the first sentence after
the bullet, the universal intuitive cognizance is mentioned, in sentence two the abstract reason,
but both are in reference to the pseudo-quote «the world is a presentation to me». in WWp
JenS lemanSki
Schopenhaueriana. reviSta eSpañola de eStudioS Sobre Schopenhauer
2017. número 2
Schopenhauer y la ciencia304
i, p. 32.4 «abstract or intuitive» are also mentioned together. therefore § 1 is neither among
cognizance nor does it belong to reason. the distinction does not begin until § 3. 
proof  of  this can be seen in the beginning of  § 7: «in them, we have proceeded neither
from the object nor from the subject, but from presentation, which contains and presupposes
both; for division into object and subject is its first, most general, and most essential form.
Thus we have considered this form first as such, and then (although in the main with reference to
the introductory treatise) the others subordinated to it, time, space, and causality, which pertain
only to the object» (p. 56, also p. 66.18-33). in this quote either §§ 1-3 or (E)FR could be meant
by the «introductory treatise». however, it is clear that Schopenhauer reflects here upon the
beginning of  his system and it seems to be obvious that it starts with the presentation which
disintegrates afterwards into subject and object (§ 2, WWp i, p. 34) from which time, space
(§ 3) and causality (§ 4) will be deduced. thus, cognizance does not begin until § 3. 
as important as §§ 5-7 may be for understanding Schopenhauer’s philosophy, these sec-
tions have no systematic relevance. the second part of  book i starts with § 8. this sections
takes up the role of  an introduction and demonstrates that, so far, only the intuitive cog-
nizance has been treated. From there the rest of  book i deals with the abstract and reflexive
reason (Vernunft), which «has one function: concept-formation» (p. 71). because of  this func-
tion, § 9 deals with language, first with logic (pp. 71-79), then with dialectic (p. 79-83). it
should also be mentioned in passing that very important amendments on logic and dialectic
are to be found in vn i, pp. 259-385 and mr iii, pp. 725-755. however, at the beginning
of  § 10 Schopenhauer reflects for the first time upon the threefold division of  the passage
concerning reason in book i (WWp i, p. 83, 22-26) and repeats this at the beginning of  § 14
(p. 96, 13-15) and § 16 (p. 120.12-16). together, these passages make clear that there are
three parts of  reason: 1. language (§ 9), 2. science (§§ 14-15), 3. practical reason (§ 16). that
§§ 10-13 are excursions which deal with the relationship between cognizance and reason is
not only shown by the fact that these sections do not fit to any of  the three parts, but also
by the fact that Schopenhauer stresses in § 14: «I now return to further discussion of  science
as, next to speech and thoughtfully aware action, the third advantage that reason provides
to humanity» (emphasis by the author; the better translation might be: «i now return to fur-
ther discussion of  science as the third, beside speech and thoughtfully aware action, advan-
tage that reason provides to humanity»). therefore the system of  the first book of  WWP I
underlies the following dihairetic structure —a mostly dichotomic but sometimes also poly-
tomic division of  concepts which was popular in (early) modern philosophy at the latest
since petrus ramus18—:
18 Cfr. Siegel, S., Tabula: Figuren der Ordnung um 1600, akademie: berlin, 2009, pp. 64-80.
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in our tree, the appendix (§§ 5-7) is highlighted because it has just an argumentative but
not a systematic relevance. the excursus (§§ 10-13) is therefore highlighted since it does not
belong to reason; but it could not be placed between § 7 and 8 by Schopenhauer because it
needs the information and arguments of  § 9. the branches of  this tree can be refined further,
and we can give some examples: § 9 can be separated, as we have seen above, into logic and
dialectic; the excursus can be separated into psychology (§ 11), ethology (§ 12) and humor (§
13) —as kant claimed (cpr bviii), these topics are already typical supplements to the classical
logic in the 18th century—. § 14 divides the sciences by their method of  subordination (like
zoology, botany, physics, chemistry, etc.) or of  coordination (like history). 
the very important § 15 continues the topic of  philosophy of  sciences («Wissenschaft-
slehre», cfr. chap. 12 of  WWP II) but deals with mathematics and philosophy, in neither of
which are subordination and coordination essential. this section is important to us because
it reveals at the end an answer to the question of  what the claim of  Schopenhauer’s philosophy
is. only now, one learns what the content of  WWP I is. Schopenhauer says that philosophy
cannot be a deductive enterprise, deriving facts from logical forms, even if  some examples
can be found in the writings of  Spinoza et al. (WWp i, p. 118). in contrast to these claims,
Schopenhauer writes about his own attempt, beginning with the words «the present philos-
ophy at least […] asks…» («die gegenwärtige [sc. philosophie] wenigstens sucht…») From
this phrase up to the end Schopenhauer reflects upon his own philosophy. here is not the
place to provide a full interpretation of  this passage. to set the scene: Schopenhauer’s phi-
losophy will deliver «all of  the manifold things in the world, incorporated into a few abstract con-
cepts according to their essence» (p. 119) thus WWP I «is a complete replication, as it were mirroring,
of  the world in abstract concepts» and Francis bacon was the precursor of  this empirical approach
(p. 119). thus, it is understandable why Schopenhauer is considered since matthias koßler
to be an empiricist philosopher rather than an idealist19.
19 koßler, m., Empirische Ethik und christliche Moral: Zur Differenz einer areligiösen und einer religiösen Grundlegung
der Ethik am Beispiel der Gegenüberstellung Schopenhauers mit Augustinus, der Scholastik und Luther, königshausen &
neumann: Würzburg, 1999.
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here, we can see that my systematic philosophical-cosmography-argument agrees with blu-
menberg’s historic absolute-book-argument: if  Schopenhauer tries to describe all facts and
phenomena of  the world in one book, then this book is nothing less than a competing alter-
native to the holy bible which had the same importance before the enlightenment. «So as
nonetheless not to lose itself  in an endless multitude of  individual judgements» (p. 118), WWP
I has to avail itself  of  abstraction, and thus the «summa of  judgements» provides a «harmony,
by virtue of  which they in fact coalesce into the unity of  a single thought» (p. 120). 
now we can piece together the puzzle to anser our question of  sect. 3 concerning what
Schopenhauer was thinking about in order to find the main or «one single thought». he
thought about the world and his one single thought consists of  the insight that the world, ac-
cording to the title, represents itself  as will and presentation. and this one single thought can
only be communicated in four books with the «summa of  judgements» in it. thus the Spier-
ling-argument seems to be correct but preface i can only be fully understood after reading §
15. and now it should be clear why the former research has seen Schopenhauer as an idealist
(since he began in § 1 with an idealistic view on the world) and why Schopenhauer is regarded
today as an empiricist or hermeneutic (since the idealistic view of  the world is just one of
«four points of  view» on the mental, social and physical world).
5. BOOK II: METAPHYSICS (WILL)
a first look at the main topics of  book ii shows no obvious dihairetic structure like book i: 
§§ Main Topic
17 meaning of  the presentation
18 Will
19 twofold view
20 characterology
21, 22 Will as thing in itself
23 principium individuationis
24 philosophy and etiology
25-27 levels of  the objectification of  Will
28 teleology
29 Summary
but the importance of  the knowledge regarding the systematic structure of  book i can be
seen in the first sentences of  § 17. there Schopenhauer reflects upon «abstract» and «per-
ceptual presentation» and focuses on the «real meaning» and the «images» of  the perceptual
presentation which «acquire an interest that lays claim to our entire essence» (WWp i, pp.
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131-132). this means that both parts of  book i are seen together since they form our entire
essence in the form of  intuition and conceptual reflection; but to ask for the meaning of  the
presentation is to ask «whether this world is nothing more than a presentation […] or whether
it is something else besides, something else beyond that, and what it might be» (p. 135). but
to my knowledge the hermeneutic term «meaning» is not mentioned in any index on Schopen-
hauer, although it is the main topic of  the entire book ii, as Schubbe found out20.
this can also be proven by the main structure of  book ii: in § 17 all sciences of  § 14-15
are classified anew (p. 132f.) by the criteria «morphology» (geology incl. mineralogy, botany,
zoology) and «etiology» (mechanics, chemistry, physics, physiology) and Schopenhauer claims
that etiology «must leave constantly unexplained the inner essences» (p. 134, also p. 161, p.
182). but in § 18, he reveals that the meaning and inner essence can be found in the metaphor
of  the Will. § 19 explains that there is a «double cognizance that we have of  our own body»,
once in the form of  direct object (presentation) and once in the form of  an indirect one
(will). the meaning of  the presentation is thus clearly marked out, as we can see in Schopen-
hauer’s words at the end of  the section: «but that which has so far been set forth in a prelim-
inary and general way, we would now more thoroughly and explicitly establish, ground, and
develop in its entire compass» (p. 143). because of  this quote, we can say that §§ 17-19 are
an answer to the question concerning the meaning and inner essence of  the presentation and
that §§ 20-29 can be seen as a development of  the former sections.
although most of  these later sections have an argumentative function, only §§ 25 to 27 are
systematically important since they are referring to the four levels of  the objectification of  will
(p. 173, also p. 197): 1. humans (highest level), 2. animals, 3. plants, 4. «inorganic realm» (lowest
level). Some information which is important to the systematic character of  WWP I can also
be found in § 26: «For what in the actual world are inseparably united as its two sides, will and
presentation, have been torn apart by these two books [sc. book i § ii], so as the more distinctly
to take cognizance of  each in its isolation» (p. 176, also p. 158, 10-11). in this quote we can
find support of  the philosophical-cosmography-argument (that the world is the topic of  WWP
I) and with the help of  this quote we can thus further complete the dihairetic tree:
20 Schubbe, d., «“… welches unser ganzes Wesen in anspruch nimmt” – Zur neubesinnung philosophischen
denkens bei Jaspers und Schopenhauer», 89, Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch (2008), pp. 19-40.
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the tree has not yet been completed but the principle of  the «world» (on top of  the
scheme) illustrates what it means that the book is a complete replication of  the world since
the conceptus summus «world» contains all other concepts of  the book (conceptus inferiores) just
as the «real» world contains all (other) things21. it is also interesting to see in the image that
all objectifications of  will relate to one or more corresponding sciences of  morphology
through which the taxonomy of  all four objectifications can be clarified in detail. For exam-
ple: the inner essence of  humans is character (WWp i, p. 167) and the science which exam-
ines this essence is «characterology». While this is only sketched out here, it will be detailed
in book iv. before we deal with this topic, it would be good to examine the structure of
book iii.
6. BOOK III: AESTHETIC (PRESENTATION)
book iii has some similarities to book i: First, it is also titled «presentation» and continues this
aspect on the world; second, the systematic structure can be seen by looking at the main topics: 
§§ Main Topic
30-32 introduction
33-38 contemplation
39, 40 the Sublime and the Stimulating
41, 42 idea & beauty
43 architecture & art of  Water-conduction
44 art of  Gardens, landscape art, Sculpture of  animals
45-47 Sculpture
48 history painting
49-51 poetry
52 music
a quick glance at the table reveals the similarity between book ii and book iii: From §§
43 to 52 each art corresponds to one of  the objectifications of  will or to the will itself. in
book ii Schopenhauer began with the will in itself  and developed the four objectifications
top-down (from the highest to the lowest level). now, in book iii, he begins bottom-up with
the lowest level of  arts to the highest one. 
21 Gabriel, m., Warum es die Welt nicht gibt, pp. 96 ff. is careful to ensure that the real world contains all other
things (except of  the world) since the world cannot be both containing and contained by itself  (see also plato,
Parm. 138b2-4; arist. Phys. iv 3, 210a25). 
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in my opinion this image illustrates the most interesting structure in WWP I because not
only does it connect book ii with book iii but it also connects the middle books of  WWP I
with the middle works of  plato: esp. in Smp. 210a-212a and rep. 508a-511e four levels are
mentioned together with a «fifth element», the idea or the anhypotheton22. Since Schopenhauer
connects kant’s thing in itself  with plato’s idea in § 31 and 32, the will as thing in itself  has
the status of  the idea. and since music is «an image of  the very will» (WWp i, p. 308), as a
«fifth element» it corresponds to will. all other levels or ideas of  arts are organized top-down
from the «fifth element» or bottom-up to it.
but the sections concerning the arts in correspondence to the levels of  objectification is
just one part of  Schopenhauer’s aesthetics. book iii is divided in three parts, as Schopenhauer
wrote at WWp i, p. 243.38-244.10 (§ 38), p. 245.23-24 (§ 39) and p. 254.30-34 (§ 41): if  we
compare these passages, we will see that §§ 33-38, dealing with contemplation and the genius,
relates to the «subjective side of  aesthetic», that §§ 39, 40, dealing with the sublime and the
stimulating, are «a particular modification of  this subjective side» and that §§ 41 and 42 are
the objective side of  aesthetic. at the end of  § 42, Schopenhauer writes: «We will now go
through the arts individually […]». this quote opens the third part about which we have re-
ported.
here, we have to speak about klamp’s thesis that book iii is the introduction to book iv,
because in the former the «serious doctrine [ernste lehre] of  the denial of  the will for life»23
should begin. First of  all, this thesis is much too broad, since klamp can only mean the sub-
jective part of  book iii in which even the affirmation and denial of  the will to life are men-
tioned. that this interpretation has no textual basis can at first be seen by WWp i, p. 315
22 Cfr. lemanski, J., Summa und System: Historie und Systematik vollendeter bottom-up- und top-down-Theorien, mentis:
münster, 2013, pp. 57-77.
23 klamp, «die architektonik im Gesamtwerk Schopenhauers», op. cit., p. 83.
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where Schopenhauer repeats that his philosophy is «nothing other than a complete and ac-
curate replication and pronouncing of  the essence of  the world in most general concepts».
thus there is no reason why the denial of  the will is more serious than, for example, the af-
firmation of  the will for life. Schopenhauer himself  speaks about the «seriousness» not due
to the denial but rather due to all «actions of  human being» because this subject «concerns
everyone immediately» (p. 321, also p. 319). on the contrary, we can find at the end of  the
first section of  book iii an anankastic conditional, which is important for understanding the
descriptive philosophy concerning contemplation and negation. the argument there is:
the anankastic conditional in (3) takes the form «if  it should be…, then must». but in the
entire WWP I there is not an indication that the subject or recipient of  the book has to fulfill
the antecedent. Schopenhauer says furthermore about WWP I that he left everyone «to his
own discretion» («Jedem sein thun anheimgebend», Gbr, 343)24. but if  the subject wish that
the ideas become objects of  cognizance, then the consequence has to be fulfilled. thus there
is no evidence for klamp’s linear interpretation between book iii and iv, unless the overall
principle of  interpretation has been presented by the anakastic conditional.
7. BOOK IV: ETHICS (WILL)
the non-normative tendency of  book iii is continued in book iv, as koßler has shown25.
although the subject of  book iv relates to practical philosophy, Schopenhauer states that
«all philosophy is always theoretical, in that it is of  its essence always to proceed purely con-
templatively […] and to inquire, not to prescribe. […] Just as it was the aim of  the preceding
three books to accomplish this from other points of  view, with the generality peculiar to phi-
losophy, so is human action to be considered in the same manner in the present book […]»
24 See also lemanski, «the denial of  the Will-to-live in Schopenhauer’s World», op. cit.
25 Cfr. koßler, Empirische Ethik und christliche Moral, op. cit.
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(1) Ideas are not subject to the Principle of Sufficient 
Ground. 
A = ¬ B 
 
(2) The subject or individual cognizance is subject to the 
Principle of Sufficient Ground. 
C = B 
     A ! C [because (1) ∧ (2)] 
(3) “If, therefore, Ideas are to become objects of cognizance, 
this can only occur with the nullification of individuality in 
the cognizant subject.” (212)   
(A = C)  → C = ¬ B 
 
                                                
         
(WWp i, pp. 321-322). here, Schopenhauer’s ambitions go along with modern world-philoso-
phers like Sider who also said: «the book of  the world says how things are, not how they
must or might be»26. as these passages of  Schopenhauer thus show, the beginning of  § 53 is
evidence for the new interpretation of  Schopenhauer’s main book, and this descriptive inter-
pretation opens up a new perspective on the main topics of  book iv:
§§ Main Topic
53 introduction
54 affirmation & denial of  the Will for life
55 excursus i: necessity of  the Will
56-59 excursus ii: life
60 affirmation of  the Will
61 egoism
62 temporal Justice
63, 64 eternal Justice
65, 66 Good & evil
67 excursus: compassion
68 denial of  the Will for life
69 (excursus:) Suicide
70 excursus: Freedom of  the Will
71 excursus: ontology
For some readers, this table has quite a few surprises. let us examine little by little and more
closely this table: in § 54 Schopenhauer says that he «would regard life precisely in a philo-
sophical manner» (p. 326) and notes that there are two attitudes to life: the affirmation and the
denial (p. 336f.). hence, the purpose of  book iv is to «depict both sorts of  phenomena and
bring them to the level of  distinct rational cognizance […], but not to prescribe or recommend
one or the other» (p. 337). here, at this passage (pp. 337.25-31), Schopenhauer indicates that
he will speak about the necessity of  the will and life before he proceeds to the discussion in
question. in WWp i (p. 362, 21 and p. 381, 35) he speaks of  a «dazwischentreten» (transl. hetero-
geneous with «intervening» and «insert») which signifies that §§ 55-59 are two excursuses. 
although these sections are excursuses, it seems to me as if  they would connect book iv
with topics of  the former books. let me stress that in 3 hypotheses: 1) book iv is a theoretical
view of  practical reason and ethics and seems therefore to continue the topic of  book i, §
16. 2) in § 55 Schopenhauer argues that «ethic» is another word for «character». thus, book
iv —more precisely speaking— deals with «characterology» and seems therefore to continue
26 Sider, Writing the Book of  the World, op. cit., p. 266.
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the topic of  book ii, § 20 (in § 56 [p. 362, 19-30] and § 58 [p. 376, 7-16] we find also a con-
nection to book ii [p. 207, 34-37] regarding a special question). 3) Whereas researchers might
once have been thought of  a purely pessimistic Schopenhauer, a close reading shows that in
book i and iii Schopenhauer, for example, talks about «harmony and unity» (p. 120) and that
«the world as presentation is the most delightful and the only innocent side of  life« (p. 318,
also p. 422, 19-23). in contrast to this, the so-called «pessimistic side» can first and foremost
be seen in the «battle for life and death» within the will, on which the author reflects in § 56
(p. 363, 22-31, referring to § 27 (pp. 187-196). the fact that the world is poor, is in WWP I
not a fact given by Schopenhauer, but rather a fact which Schopenhauer deduces from dante
in § 59 (p. 380), which is just part of  the excursus. thus WWP I gives no reason to focus ex-
clusively on Schopenhauer as a pessimistic author, except for the bias of  the researcher.
after the excursus, the first part of  book iv starts. this part extends from § 60 to 67 and
deals with the affirmation of  the will. Similarly to book ii, Schopenhauer asks about the «be-
deutung» (p. 382, 4; p. 415, 29; p. 418, 13: „significance«, better: «meaning») of  the affirmation
and the denial of  will. his method can be described as «consequentialist» since he infers the
ethical principle of  the affirmation or denial (consequence) from the observable actions (an-
tecendens)27. Schopenhauer reflects on his consequentialist view on p. 337, 18, p. 354, 2-10,
p. 356, 22-31 and uses this method in the first part of  book iv by pp. 400, 35-401, 4, p. 434,
3-6. While in research this method remained unconsidered, there have been many studies on
compassion with reference to § 67. but § 68 opens with the words «after this digression re-
garding the identity of  pure love with compassion, […]» indicating that § 67 was also an ex-
cursus and not a main issue of  the system. 
after the excursus, the last part of  book iv starts with § 68. this part consists of  only §
68 (and perhaps § 69) which resumes «the thread of  our interpretation of  the ethical signifi-
cance [bedeutung] of  action» (p. 438; also p. 448, 1-4; p. 461, 34-37) and deals with the denial
of  the will. that this part is the «end», «last» or «final» one (German: letzte Teil, zuletzt),
Schopenhauer indicates at p. 418, 13, p. 434, 32 and p. 438, 28. in this part, Schopenhauer re-
peats the empiricist approach of  his philosophical cosmography (p. 444, 11-19; p. 445, 2-7)
and the resulting consequentialist method (p. 444, 2 4-33), which enables him to infer the
moral meaning of  the denial of  the will for life from the deeds and actions of  a saint.
it is difficult to say whether the last part of  book iv ends at the beginning of  § 69 or §
70: at the beginning of  § 69, Schopenhauer speaks of  the «now […] adequately depicted
[nunmehr… hinlänglich dargestellten] denial of  the will for life» (p. 462); but at the beginning of
§ 70, he also speaks of  «our now concluded depiction [unsere ganze nunmehr beendigte
darstellung] of  that which i call denial of  the will» (p. 467). Since the content of  § 69 says
27 Cfr. lemanski, J., «Schopenhauers hagioethischer konsequentialismus im System der Welt als Wille und
Vorstellung», 93, Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch (2012), pp. 485-503. Cfr. furthermore koßler, Empirische Ethik und christliche
Moral, op. cit., pp. 422-460.
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that suicide is not a form of  the denial of  the will, i would prefer to classify § 69 as an excur-
sus, but the «now» (nunmehr) in both quotes left the question concerning the end of  the last
part ambigious. it is however certain that § 70 and 71 are supplements to the system because
they deal with a «seeming contradiction» (p. 467, 8; p. 474, 9) and an «objection» (p. 474, 19). 
thus there is no textual basis for a linear interpretation from idealism to mysticism and
nothingness because § 1 is just an introduction and § 71 a supplement of  the system. this
can also be seen in VN I and VN IV in which Schopenhauer does not start with the phrase
«the world is a presentation to me» and does not end with «nothing».
8. CONCLUSION
We have seen that klamp’s pioneering work has to be completely revised. there are sometimes
many more relationships within WWP I than he has seen, and sometimes there are fewer. i
think that it would be important for current research 1) to test my results, 2) to concentrate
on the structure of  the single sections within WWP I and 3) to focus on the definitions in
WWP I, which i have not done here.
1) For example, our systematic overview shows no textual evidence for klamp’s thesis that
book iv contains the «impressive closing passage» of  the organic system, so that book iii is
an introduction to it. however, book iv is subject to an anankastic conditional similar to the
one for book iii: if  someone will affirm or deny his will to live, then he must act in a specific
manner. Since we just see the way in which one acts, we can now, with the help of  Schopen-
hauer’s conceptual scheme, determine each act to a specific ethical class. to this end, Schopen-
hauer appears to be a pragmatist who helps his reader to orient themselves in the world. With
reference to this premise of  interpretation, my approach has corrected klamp’s results con-
cerning the inner and external construction of  WWP I. however, a lot more research work
is required before we can fully understand the structure within WWP I and the relationship
between WWP I and the other works of  Schopenhauer.
2) to understand the function of  a section within the organic system it seems to be im-
portant to understand the structure of  the section itself. § 68 contains, for example, one of
the most difficult structures within WWP I: at first, Schopenhauer describes the deeds and
the saint’s way of  life. interrupted by many excursuses, which i am not able to describe in
detail here, this part reaches up to p. 448.18. the second part is a «depiction […] of  ethical
precepts» (p. 448) like the imitatio-christi-doctrine or «love for one’s neighbor with utter re-
nunciation of  all self-love» (p. 451) among hindus. the third and last part starts at p. 452, 21
and Schopenhauer says that he «would only add a little to the general characterization of  their
[sc. deniers] state». thus this part is a supplement to the first one. there are many sections
like this one which are very difficult to understand because Schopenhauer just reflects on
their structure, method and function in sub-clauses, which are normally ignored.
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3) Following kant’s maxim that «if  we have the original and primitive concepts, it is easy
to add the derivative and subsidiary, and so to give a complete picture of  the family tree»
(cpr a82/b108), i have not added such trees in sect. 6 and 7. if  we would like to give a
complete picture of  the WWP I’s family tree, we would likely find definitions in the lower
part of  the picture. it is an advantage of  lütkehaus’ edition that in it all parts of  texts, which
were originally in antiqua, are italicized, and all parts of  texts, which originally had a wide
tracking, are small capitals. in WWP Imost small capitals mark the definiendum. For example,
a brief  look into § 13 would reveal that Schopenhauer marks the definition of  «laughter»
(Lachen), «wit» (Witz), «foolishness» (Narrheit), «pedantry» (Pedanterie), etc. these definitions
would be the basis of  the dihairetic ontology of  WWP I and offer the reader a conceptual
scheme of  demarcations with which she is able to find her way through the world. While for
most people «laughter», «wit» or «foolishness» are one and the same, for people who are fa-
miliar with WWP I it is easy to deduce the differences out of  the world with its principle «pre-
sentation» and «will». if  a book tries to replicate the whole world in abstract words then it
cannot fail to define the most abstract being in the world: ontology. thus the function of  §
71 can only be seen by focusing on the definitions within it, i.e. «that which is» (das Seiende)
and nothing (Nichts) with all its derivative concepts. at a time well before the internet and
also in a time of  an overwhelming diversity and density of  information it was and is useful
to classify the intuitive world in those abstract concepts. thus, it should be a noble task of
research to focus on the upper and lower and on the macroscopic as well as microscopic
structures of  Schopenhauer’s system.
in my opinion, most confusion within Schopenhauer research lies in the method of  using
every work or even every word we have from the philosopher to work on specific systematic
problems. We are debating whether hübscher’s edition or lütkehaus’s so called «ausgabe let-
zter hand» is the best one, but we do not see that Schopenhauer’s own revisions are prob-
lematic contortions of  the original content. Schopenhauer himself  was aware of  this problem
and does not have many additions in WWP I. thus the current issues of  WWP I are among
the best texts we have of  Schopenhauer in relation to most of  his other works. but if  we
compare it with perhaps WWP II we get more information but also more problems which
result from the author’s own misinterpretation (cfr. i. e. sect. 3) and especially the fact that he
became more and more embittered. because of  the pejorative comments of  the older
Schopenhauer, the reader gets a false impression; because WWP I is not simply a matter of
the pessimistic world, but rather the entire world —the world of  will and presentation, which
is of  battle as well as of  harmony—. 
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